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BEFORE THE ARIZONA CORPORATION COMMISSION

1 2 COMMISSIONERS 3 MIKE GLEASON, Chairman JEFF HATCH-MILLER 4 WILLIAM A. MUNDELL KRISTIN K. MAYES 5 **GARY PIERCE** 6 In the matter of: 7 AGRA-TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (a/k/a ATI), a Nevada corporation, 8 5800 North Dodge Avenue, Bldg. A Flagstaff, Arizona 86004-2963: WILLIAM JAY PIERSON (a/k/a BILL) 10 PIERSON), and SANDRA LEE PIERSON (a/k/a SANDY 11 PIERSON), husband and wife, 12 6710 Lynx Lane Flagstaff, Arizona 86004-1404; 13 RICHARD ALLEN CAMPBELL (a/k/a DICK 14 CAMPBELL). and SONDRA JANE CAMPBELL, 15 husband and wife, 8686 West Morten Avenue 16 Glendale, Arizona 85305-3940; 17 WILLIAM H. BAKER, JR. (a/k/a BILL BAKER), and PATRICIA M. BAKER, 18 husband and wife, 3027 N. Alta Vista 19 Flagstaff, Arizona 86004; 20 JERRY JOHNSTON HODGES, 1858 Gunlock Court 21 Saint George, Utah 84790-6705; 22 LAWRENCE KEVIN PAILLE (a/k/a LARRY) PAILLE), 23 220 Pinon Woods Drive Sedona, Arizona 86351-6902; 24

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Respondents.

Arizona Corporation Commission DOCKETED

AUG 2 4 2007

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DOCKET NO. S-20484A-06-0669

SECURITIES DIVISION'S RESPONSE TO APPLICATION TO INTERVENE AND **EXPEDITED RULING ON APPLICATION** TO INTERVENE

(Administrative Law Judge Marc Stern)

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The Securities Division ("Division") of the Arizona Corporation Commission ("Commission") responds to the Application to Intervene ("Application") brought pursuant to A.A.C. R14-4-301 and A.A.C. R14-3-105 and the Motion for Expedited Ruling ("Motion") made of behalf of certain participants in the Ore Rights and Mining project of Agra Technologies, Inc. ("ATI") ("Petitioners").¹ For the reasons set forth herein, the Division respectfully requests that the Application and Motion be denied.

A. Petitioners are not directly and substantially affected by the administrative proceedings and should not be permitted to intervene.

1. The authority of the Commission to enforce the Arizona Securities Act in the context of an administrative proceeding is limited by A.R.S. §44-2032(1).

Enforcement of the Arizona Securities Act ("Securities Act"), A.R.S. §44-1801 et seq., protects a public right. The primary purpose of the Securities Act is to protect the public from fraudulent securities transactions and to preserve fair and equitable business practices. See Laws 1951, ch. 18, §20. To protect the public, the Securities Act imposes a variety of requirements on parties selling securities, including disclosure of material information, reporting requirements for ongoing activities, and oversight responsibilities of dealers and salesmen. The Arizona legislature has charged the Commission with the enforcement of the Securities Act. A.R.S. §44-2032. See also, Carrington v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n, 199 Ariz. 303,306, 18 P.3d 97,100 (Ct. App. 2001), rev. denied. In the present case, the Division has alleged that the Respondents² violated both the registration requirements and the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act. ³

The jurisdiction of an administrative agency may be limited by the statutes authorizing the

¹ Petitioners consist of Sperry Andrews, Hoffa Bogart, Colin Caie, Bob and Peggy De Young, Rhonda Faris-Holman, Patricia Kerschner, Nigel Smith, James Sweet, Jeanie Stevenson, James Urquhart, and Dave and Janet Vette.

² Respondents Richard Allen Campbell and Sondra Jane Campbell entered into an Order to Cease and Desist, Order of Restitution, and Order for Administrative Penalties ("Consent") which was approved by the Commission on August 13, 2007 as Decision No. 69774. Respondents Jerry Johnston Hodges and Lawrence Kevin Paille have also entered into a Consent the approval of which is to be addressed by the Commission at its next regularly scheduled open meeting. Accordingly, for purposes of this Response, "Respondents" shall be defined as Agra-Technologies, Inc., William Jay and Sandra Lee Pierson, William H. Baker, Jr., and Patricia M. Baker.

³ On October 18, 2006, the Division filed a Temperary Order to Cease and Desist and Notice of Opportunity for

³ On October 18, 2006, the Division filed a Temporary Order to Cease and Desist and Notice of Opportunity for Hearing which was amended on June 12, 2007 by the filing of its First Amended Temporary Order to Cease and Desist and Notice for Opportunity for Hearing ("First Amended TC&D and Notice").

agency to act. The Arizona Supreme Court has consistently held that the Commission has no implied authority to act. *Rural/Metro Corp. v. Arizona Corp. Comm'n*, 129 Ariz. 116, 117, 629

P.2d 83, 84 (1981) ("such powers as the Commission may exercise do not exceed those to be derived from a strict construction of the constitution and implementing statutes"). The

derived from a strict construction of the **constitution** and implementing statutes"). The Commission's authority to enforce the **Securities** Act in an *administrative proceeding* is **set forth in** A.RS. §44-2032(1). Specifically, A.R.S. §44-2032(1) provides as follows:

If it appears to the commission, either on complaint or otherwise, that any person has engaged in, is engaging in or is about to engage in any act, practice or transaction, that constitutes a violation of this chapter, or any rule or order of the commission under this chapter, the commission may, in its discretion:

1. Issue an order directing such person to cease and desist from engaging in the act, practice or transaction, or doing any other act in furtherance of the act, practice or transaction, and to take appropriate affirmative action within a reasonable time, as prescribed by the commission, to correct the conditions resulting from the act, practice or transaction including, without limitation, a requirement to provide restitution as prescribed the rules of the commission.

The Arizona legislature has also authorized the Commission to impose administrative penalties. See A.R.S. §44-2036. As a result, the Commission does not have any jurisdiction to adjudicate the individual and private rights of the Petitioners in the instant regulatory action.

In support of their Application, the Petitioners argue that if the Division's allegations are proven, the "Intervenors could lose their entire financial commitments as well as their right to mineral aggregate purchased pursuant to their contracts." See Application at p.3, lines 2-4. The Petitioners, who are not parties to the regulatory action, offer no further explanation as to how an administrative decision rendered by the Commission could affect any of their claims (e.g., private actions for violations of the Securities Act, breach of contract, declaratory relief, and common law fraud) against the Respondents. In fact, a private right of action for violations of the Securities Act may be brought against the Respondents pursuant to A.R.S. §44-2001 through A.R.S. §44-2005, along with any common law actions, in a civil court of competent jurisdiction in which all of the rights, duties and obligations as between the Respondents and the Petitioners may be resolved.

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2. Petitioners' personal knowledge regarding the allegations in dispute in this matter can adequately be presented by the parties in the regulatory action against Respondents.

The role of the Petitioners, as investors, in a regulator action for violations of the Securities Act is most appropriate as witnesses. In support of the Application, the Petitioners assert that they have personal knowledge regarding certain allegations contained in the First Amended TC&D and Notice and, absent intervention, such knowledge will go ignored. See Application at p.3, lines 9-13. This assumes that neither the Division nor Respondents will call any of the Petitioners to testify at the administrative hearing. The Petitioners also state that the Division has not attempted to investigate their claims. See Application at p.3, lines 5-7. This statement is inaccurate. Even if true, nothing prevents the Petitioners from forwarding information (e.g., investment documents, correspondences with the Respondents, and written statements) to the Division. The investigation by the Division is ongoing. Witness and exhibit lists have not yet been exchanged by the parties. Accordingly, the claims of Petitioners that their testimony and/or information will not be made a part of the record in this regulatory action are unfounded.

3. A non-party is not bound by a judgment to which it is not a party.

It is a fundamental tenet of law that a non-party is simply not bound by a judgment in an action to which it was not a party. As the Arizona Supreme Court has recognized, generally a person who is not a party to an action is not bound by the result. Scottsdale Mem'l Health Sys., Inc. v. Clark, 157 Ariz. 461, 466, 759 P.2d 607, 612 (1988). Whether by way of res judicata or collateral estoppel, the preclusive effect of a judgment is limited to parties and persons in privity with parties. See Fremont Indem. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 144 Ariz. 339, 342, 697 P.2d 1089, 1092 (1985) ("a stranger to a litigation may not be bound by a determination made therein for purposes of subsequent litigation"). Thus, a decision by the Commission rendered at the completion of its regulatory action will only resolve the issues in dispute as between the Commission and the

⁴ Attempts by the Division to procure information and documents from the Petitioners have been largely ignored or contested.

⁵ Cooperation by investors is an integral and necessary part of any investigation conducted by the Division pursuant to A.R.S. §44-1822. However, it would be inappropriate to allow such interested individuals to govern the manner in which such investigation is conducted.

Respondents. See supra at p. 3, lines 17-26.

4. The Petitioners cite to case law which does not support their Application.

The Petitioners cite to three civil cases as support for their Application in the regulatory action against Respondents. Each of the three cases are procedurally and substantively distinct from the case before the Commission. None of the three cases supports Petitioners' request to intervene.

In Mountain States Tel. v. Corp. Comm'n, 160 Ariz. 350, 773 P.2d 445 (1989), petitioners were "ScoopLine" providers, providers of information services carried over Mountain Bell's telephone lines. After numerous customer complaints regarding ScoopLine providers, the Commission ordered Mountain Bell to implement universal blocking of all ScoopLines.

Petitioners requested permission to intervene in a special action before the Arizona Supreme Court brought by Mountain Bell to challenge the Commission's order.

The Mountain States court granted petitioners' request under rule 2, Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, which rule authorizes intervention under the provisions of rule 24 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Even if rule 24 was applicable to an administrative regulatory action before the Commission, the petitioners in this case do not meet the Mountain States substantive standard. The petitioners operated services that were regulated by the Commission's order. The Commission's order affected the conduct of petitioners' businesses and the ability of petitioners to communicate with potential customers. Thus, the Arizona Supreme Court granted intervention because the Commission's order could impair the petitioners' fundamental federal and Arizona constitutional rights.

The ScoopLine providers were directly and substantially affected by the Commission's order that Mountain Bell implement universal blocking of all ScoopLines. The Commission's decision in this case will not impair a fundamental constitution right or affect the conduct of any of the businesses of Petitioners. The only interest Petitioners have that connect them to Respondents in

any way is their financial investment in ATI. A Commission decision that Respondents have violated Arizona law will not directly and substantially affect Petitioners. The Petitioners' rights with respect to their financial interests are not subject to adjudication by the Commission and an order of the Commission does not preclude petitioners from protecting their financial interests in an Arizona court of law.

In Saunders v. Superior Court In and For County of Maricopa, 109 Ariz. 424, 510 P.2d 740 (1973), petitioners sought to intervene in a lawsuit filed by the City of Nogales and two of its taxpayers. Plaintiffs sought to have the act creating the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System declared unconstitutional. Petitioners were employees of members of the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System and beneficiaries of the retirement system. Under the standards of rule 24 of the civil rules of procedure, the Saunders court reversed the trial court because if the Public Safety Personnel Retirement System was declared unconstitutional in the proceeding, the principles of stare decisis would effectively dispose of petitioners' interests without any opportunity for them to be heard. Unlike the case in Saunders, the Commission's decision in this case will not preclude Petitioners, through the principles of stare decisis or any other principles, from pursuing their financial interests in the appropriate forum.

In Hill v. Alpha Seed & Lumber Co., 38 Ariz. 70, 297 P. 868 (1931), the court reversed the denial of an application for intervention from G.A. Hill. The lawsuit was brought by a company seeking payment from a surety company and the bond the surety held for building material the company provided to Mr. Hill. Mr. Hill was the principal under the construction contract and the bond securing performance. The court noted that "the interest which entitles a person to intervene in a suit between other parties must be in the matter in litigation and of such direct and immediate character that the intervener will either gain or lose by the direct legal operation and effect of the judgment." The court stated that "if the party seeking to intervene shows by his pleadings that he is primarily or ultimately the person liable for any judgment between the other litigants, he should

⁶ Rule 24 has since been amended to include the **except**ion for intervention if "the applicant's interest is adequately represented by existing parties."

be allowed to intervene." The court went on to note that Mr. Hill not only had a absolute **right to** intervene, but that it was the duty of the court *sua sponte* to order him made an additional party.

Obviously, Petitioners have no statutory right to intervene. Additionally, Petitioners are not directly and substantially affected as was Mr. Hill in Alpha Seed & Lumber Co. Petitioners will not be liable for any order against respondents for violating Arizona law. While Petitioners' may argue that Respondents' liability under a Commission decision may make recouping Petitioners' investments more difficult for Petitioners, under any standard or rule a race for the money is not sufficient to support intervention. See Miller v. City of Phoenix, 51 Ariz. 254, 75 P.2d 1033 (Ct. App. 1938) (right of action for damages not affected by a judgment in suit between plaintiff and defendant). A Commission order to cease and desist violating the law does not preclude operation of a legitimate business in compliance with the law. If Respondents fail to do so, the Securities Act expressly preserves to investors, such as Petitioners, the opportunity to pursue their rights and interests in a private action. See Title 44, Chapter 12, Article 14.

B. <u>Disclosure of information contained in the Division's investigative files to Petitioners is contrary to the mandates of A.R.S. \$44-2042.</u>

Petitioners imply some impropriety on the part of the Division because it because staff has not disclosed confidential information regarding its investigation to Petitioners. However, such non-disclosure by the Division of confidential information is mandated by statute.

A.R.S. § 44-1822 authorizes the Commission or its designated agents to make such investigations – public or private - as the Commission deems necessary to determine whether any person has violated the Arizona Securities Act. Information and records obtained during the course of a Commission investigation are subject to A.R.S. § 44-2042. Under A.R.S. § 44-2042 ("confidentiality statute"), information and documents obtained by the Commission during its investigations are confidential, unless made a matter of public record. The confidentiality statute prohibits the Commission's officers, employees, and agents from making such information or documents available to anyone other than members or agents of the Commission, the attorney

general, or law enforcement officials, absent disclosure authorization from the Commission or the Securities Division Director as not contrary to the public interest. Furthermore, disclosure during an investigation is contrary to the public interest and courts have frequently held that due process does not require such disclosure. See e.g. Willner v. Committee on Character and Fitness, 83 S. Ct. 1175 (1963) (procedural due process requires confrontation and cross-examination);

Electromec Design & Dev. Co. v. NLRB, 409 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1969) (denial of prehearing depositions is not a denial of due process because the respondent has opportunity to cross examine the witnesses at a full hearing.); Pet v. Dept. of Health Serv., 207 Conn. 346, 542 A.2d 672 (1988) quoting Federal Trade Comm'n v. Anderson, 631 F.2d 741, 748 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (Constitution does not require that a respondent be aware of all evidence, information, and leads; respondent has right to due notice of the hearing, the right to produce relevant evidence, the right to cross-examine witnesses produced by his adversary, and the right to be fairly apprised of the facts upon which the agency will act).

C. The Administrative Law Judge has the authority to allow a consumer to be heard at a designated time without intervention.

The Rules of Practice and Procedure permit a consumer to be heard at a designated time during an administrative proceeding without first becoming a party through intervention. A.A.C. R14-3-105(C) provides, in relevant part, as follows:

C. Other appearances. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsections R14-3-305(A) and R14-3-105(B), any consumer or prospective consumer may appear at any proceeding and make a statement on his own behalf, at a time designated by the Commission or presiding officer. A person so appearing shall not be deemed a party to the proceedings.

D. Petitioner's basis for an expedited ruling on their Application is misplaced.

In their Motion, Petitioner's seek an expedited ruling on their Application so that they can participate in ongoing discovery. See Motion p.2, lines 2-6. While the Division's investigation

⁷ The state of Arizona has enacted both statutes and agency rules to address the issue of discovery in the context of administrative proceedings. Both the Arizona Revised Statutes and the Arizona Rules of Practice and Procedure before the Corporation Commission contain explicit provisions addressing discovery procedures in contested administrative adjudications. See A.R.S. §41-1062 and A.A.C. R-14-3-101 et seq.

pursuant to A.R.S. §44-18228 is ongoing, no discovery has been ordered by the Administrative 1 2 Law Judge as part of these administrative proceedings. Accordingly, there is no need for an expedited ruling on Petitioners' Application. 3 RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 24% day of August, 2007. 4 5 He Colenar 6 7 Assistant Chief Counsel of Enforcement 8 Securities Division 1300 West Washington, Third Floor 9 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 10 ORIGINAL AND THIRTEEN (13) COPIES of the foregoing filed this day of 11 12 August, 2007 with: 13 **Docket Control** Arizona Corporation Commission 14 1200 West Washington Phoenix, Arizona 85007 15 Copy of the foregoing hand-delivered this 24 day 16 of August, 2007 to: 17 Mr. Marc Stern 18 Administrative Law Judge Arizona Corporation Commission 19 Hearing Division 1200 West Washington 20 Phoenix, Arizona 85007 21 22 23 24 25

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⁸ As part of the investigation, the Division may conduct examinations under oath pursuant to A.R.S. §44-1823.

1	Copy of the foregoing electronically mailed and mailed this 24 day of August, 2007 to:
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